Giving a Voice – Increasing Individual Self-Expression to Enhance the Resilience to System Discontent

Individuals in a group who repeatedly experience that their group's policy selection system does not decide in their favor may develop system discontent and system disbelief. System discontent reflects individual dissatisfaction with the decision-making process, while system disbelief captures the perception that the system does not benefit the group as a whole. Both may be detrimental to collective outcomes, affecting group members' psychological well-being and their willingness to exert effort, make financial contributions, or participate in cooperative coordination. In this experimental study, I investigate whether allowing individuals to express and explain their preferences affects the development of system discontent and system disbelief. I examine three different group policy selection mechanisms, each combined with two communication modes: with and without voice. Decisions are made either by a single decision maker (dictator), by AI (ChatGPT), or by Borda Count (automated). In the latter two treatments, an independent observer is added to keep the overall number of players constant across treatments. Voice reduces system discontent and system disbelief under the Dictator and Borda mechanisms — but not under AI. However, voice also amplifies loss sensitivity, as unmet expectations intensify both discontent and disbelief. Interestingly, the majority of participants prefer no-voice systems, with AI participants showing the weakest preference for voice; yet participants who wrote longer arguments are more likely to want voice. Arguments directed at the AI are rated as most convincing, most vivid, and least self-oriented, suggesting that participants engage in more objective and elaborate reasoning when addressing an algorithm. These findings shed light on the drivers of discontent with policy selection systems and offer insights for managers and policymakers on designing mechanisms that build resilience against system discontent and system disbelief.

Status: Writing up paper

Feeling Forgotten – The Rise of System Disbelief

with Karim Sadrieh

Individuals who repeatedly experience that their group's policy selection system does not decide in their favor may feel increasingly forgotten and develop system disbelief — the belief that the decision-making mechanism is unfavorable for one's group. We conduct a laboratory experiment examining the development of system discontent (the evaluation that the decision-making mechanism is unfavorable for oneself) and system disbelief across four policy selection systems: Borda, Committee, Dictator, and Random. We additionally examine how positive and negative framing shapes these dynamics. Our results indicate that unfavorable outcomes lead to system discontent and system disbelief when the subject's involvement with the topic is high, with effects intensifying under negative framing. These findings shed light on group decision dynamics and suggest that positive framing can mitigate system discontent, system disbelief, and ensuing destructive behaviors.

Status: Writing up paper

Beyond the Contract: Fairness, Observability, and Discretionary Effort

with Simon Halliday, Eugene Malthouse, and Anastasia Papadopoulou

People generally sign an employment contract when joining an organization. At the same time, they often enter into a social contract — an implicit agreement to go beyond the formal job description to support the organization when needed. Such behaviors, known as organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), include volunteering for non-contractual tasks that are essential for institutional functioning but not formally assigned. We investigate two factors that influence individuals' willingness to engage in discretionary OCBs: (i) perceived fairness in compensation, and (ii) the observability of voluntary effort opportunities. We implement a pre-registered, real-effort gift-exchange experiment with six treatment conditions that vary systematically when principals and agents learn about a voluntary effort task. We find strong support for reciprocity-based predictions at both the extensive margin (whether agents provide voluntary effort) and the intensive margin (how much effort they provide). Fairness perceptions have heterogeneous, treatment-dependent effects. Notably, agents frequently provide voluntary effort even when principals cannot observe it, pointing to intrinsic motivation beyond purely strategic reciprocity. Information structure matters: the proportion of non-providers is highest in the treatment where principals receive information only immediately before the splitting decision.

Status: Writing up paper

Voluntary Cooperation in the Long Run

This study examines whether the deliberate decision to join a social dilemma situation increases cooperation. We conduct an online laboratory experiment using z-Tree Unleashed in which subjects receive an outside option prior to playing a repeated public goods game. To investigate how cooperation varies across player types, we first elicit cooperative types using a strategy elicitation method. Rejecting an outside option is proposed as a mechanism that alters subjects' beliefs regarding the contributions of interaction partners. A non-credible outside option increases cooperation in the first round but does not prevent the typical decay pattern throughout the game. A credible outside option, in contrast, fosters sustainable cooperation throughout the game via the exclusion of free riders.

Status: Writing up paper